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1. Introduction
Business dynamics of the 21st century are increas-
ingly determined and driven by intellectual capi-
tal/knowledge-based elements. Numerous
corporate executives, practitioners and business
professionals, policymakers and scholars alike ac-
knowledge factors of production, products and
services, and market place dynamics will be radi-
cally different than previously. The coming centu-
ry will by necessity be an integrated and
technologically networked global economy, re-
casting comparative advantages and discriminat-
ing pricing for goods and services. In the future
business and economic landscape, raw materials
and their processing will decline in value whilst
that of intellectual capital resources will increase.
This clearly calls for a refreshed – if not alternative
– understanding of business principles, informa-
tion reporting and decision-making processes.
Market participants, practitioners and regulators
alike argue there is an important need for greater
investigation and understanding of intellectual
capital disclosure as the usefulness of financial in-
formation in explaining firm profitability contin-
ues to deteriorate (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Bukh
(2003), for example, asserts that traditional report-
ing mechanisms are not able to cope adequately
with the reporting requirements of new economy
firms. Bozzolan et al. (2003), meanwhile, observe
an increasing dissatisfaction with traditional finan-
cial reporting and its ability to convey to investors
the wealth creation potential of firms.
Despite growing interest and demand for intel-
lectual capital information, prior research (e.g.
Williams, 2001; Beaulieu, et al., 2002; Garcia-
Meca et al., 2005) suggests a persistent and signif-
icant variation in the quantity and quality of
information reported by firms on this pivotal re-
source. As existing economic and business metrics
track a declining proportion of the real economy,
the deficiency and inconsistency in the reporting
of intellectual capital-related information is creat-
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ing growing information asymmetry between in-
formed and uninformed investors (Eustace, 2000;
Gröjer, 2001; Walker, 2006). This provides fertile
ground for informed investors to extract higher ab-
normal returns.
Opportunities for informed investors to extract
higher wealth transfers from uninformed investors
are particularly ripe when information asymmetry
is naturally high such as a firm’s initial public of-
fering (IPO). Liberalisation of financial capital
movement, in conjunction with financial market
integration, provided an enriched sustainable envi-
ronment during the past decade for the intensive
expansion of numerous capital markets world-
wide. A growing proportion of IPOs listing during
this period – and with numbers projected to in-
crease in the future – are intellectual capital inten-
sive firms. Greater listing of firms particularly
prone to information asymmetry concerns pro-
vides an additional incentive to understanding in-
tellectual capital disclosure practices of IPOs.
Despite the increasingly significant role to
today’s firms, and intensive information asymme-
try concerns (particularly within an IPO setting),
very few studies have addressed the issue of intel-
lectual disclosure practices by listing firms. Our
study addresses this important void in the account-
ing, finance and intellectual capital literatures.
Drawing on signalling theory, we identify and ex-
amine three potential determinants that may pro-
mote or constrain voluntary intellectual capital
disclosure in IPO prospectuses. The three specific
determinants investigated are: (1) ownership re-
tention; (2) proprietary costs; and (3) corporate
governance structure.
Past IPO literature suggests ownership retention
(Leland and Pyle, 1977) is a signal of firm quality.
We extend this notion postulating ownership reten-
tion is a complementary signal to intellectual capi-
tal disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) suggests firms
faced with high proprietary costs are likely to limit
voluntary disclosure. Based on this contention, it is
our conjecture the intellectual capital disclosure–
ownership retention association will be suppressed
by the extent of proprietary costs faced by an IPO.
Previous researchers suggest corporate governance
structure can reduce a firm’s cost of capital (e.g.
Certo et al., 2001). Consequently, our final conjec-
ture is that stronger corporate governance structures
mitigate negative influences of higher proprietary
costs on the association between intellectual capital
disclosure levels and ownership retention.
Singapore is a vibrant environment for investi-
gating issues related to intellectual capital and IPOs.
First, with a very small land mass, Singapore’s
rapid economic growth is primarily driven by de-
velopment of key intellectual capital resources.
Second, Singapore is ranked one of the world’s
most business-friendly economies (World Bank,
2007). Also, Singapore has a well-established cor-
porate law and governance system (Political and
Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), 2006; The
Fraster Institute, 2007).1 Similarities with regulato-
ry practices in major capital markets will enable re-
sults from our study to be generalised more
broadly. For example, the corporate regulatory sys-
tem in Singapore was adapted from the British and
still bears close resemblance today. Also, the legal
and governance framework is highly aligned with
the Commonwealth model such that Singapore is
recognised as a corporate governance leader in
Asia (Mak and Chng, 2000).2 Accounting standards
in Singapore have long been highly consistent with
IAS/IFRS requirements with accounting practices
regulated by professional institutions (e.g. Institute
of Certified Public Accountant of Singapore
(ICPAS); Stock Exchange of Singapore (SGX))
and government bodies (e.g. Accounting Standards
Council (ASC)) (ACGA, 2007). The auditing mar-
ket in Singapore is dominated by Big Four ac-
counting firms (Rusmin et al., 2006) whilst there
are sophisticated intermediaries such as security
analysts, credit rating agencies and investors acting
as market monitors (Mak and Chng, 2000). Finally,
Singapore’s capital and IPO markets are mature,
highly active and internationalised.3 Comprising
two primary boards (SGX Main Board and SGX
SESDAQ)4 the SGX has grown significantly since
the late-1990s with the number of firms listed by
the end of 2006 having more than doubled (nearly
three times) since the start of 1997 (SGX Factbook,
2006).
Statistical analysis is based on a sample of 444
IPOs listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange
(SGX)5 between 1 January 1997 and 31 December
410 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 Singapore’s corporate governance system is perceived to
be the highest in Asia whilst the legal system is also ranked
number one in Asia for integrity and lack of corruption (La
Porta et al., 1997, 1998; PERC, 2006).
2 Relative to other Asian nations (and many worldwide)
Singapore has been a leader in developing corporate gover-
nance practices. For example, since 1990 publicly listed firms
in Singapore have been required to have established audit
committees. In contrast, audit committees were not formally
required in other Asian (and many developed economies like
Australia) nations until the late 1990s.
3 As of 31 December 2006, more than 20% of firms listed
on the SGX were domiciled overseas (SGX Factbook, 2006).
4 Firms wishing to list on the SGX Main Board are subject
to higher initial pre-listing performance standards than coun-
terparts listing on the SGX SESDAQ. In essence, the SGX
SESDAQ was established to allow younger firms without a
lengthier, positive financial performance history access to cap-
ital market funding.
5 The highly internationalised SGX is a pivotal capital mar-
ket in Asia with listed firms having more than doubled since
1997. We focus on Singapore because the nation’s lack of nat-
ural resources meaning profitability of Singapore firms is
highly dependent upon the development and maintenance of
intellectual capital resources. Consequently, intellectual capi-
tal disclosure is important to Singapore firms and market par-
ticipants in enabling better valuations.
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2006. We find average intellectual capital disclo-
sure levels in IPO prospectuses increased annually
between 1997 and 2006. Statistical tests indicate a
significant positive association between intellectu-
al capital disclosure and ownership retention.
Additionally, we find a negative influence of pro-
prietary costs on the positive intellectual capital
disclosure–ownership retention linkage. Contrary
to expectations we do not find better corporate
governance structures influence the ownership re-
tention–proprietary cost–intellectual capital dis-
closure interaction. Our findings have implications
for various parties. For example, regulators may
impose unnecessary costs on issuers if mandatory
reporting is introduced without sufficient under-
standing of factors influencing intellectual capital
disclosure.
Our study contributes to various literatures (i.e.
accounting, finance and intellectual capital) in two
key aspects. First, our study considers potential de-
terminants of intellectual capital disclosure most
befitting of an IPO setting. Previous related work
(e.g. Bukh et al., 2005a) generally concentrates on
traditionally established disclosure determinants
such as firm size, leverage or firm performance.
Findings from our study help build an expanded
profile of factors influencing intellectual capital
disclosure. Second, we draw on the tenets of an es-
tablished theoretical perspective to consider the
underlying rationale motivating disclosure of in-
tellectual capital-related information. This is con-
trary to prior intellectual capital disclosure
determinant research that usually lacks an underly-
ing theoretical foundation to explain why factors
selected influence intellectual capital disclosure
practices. Application in our study of a specific
theoretical perspective can provide a foundation
for more constructive theorisation of intellectual
capital disclosure practices in the future. Aside
from the two major contributions noted we provide
other important offerings. For example, our in-
depth longitudinal study provides further evidence
of growth in quantity of intellectual capital infor-
mation disclosed during the past two decades.
Furthermore, we report about intellectual capital
disclosure practices for firms from a nation reliant
on intellectual capital not previously examined;
thereby, adding an additional piece to the global
jigsaw map on intellectual capital disclosure prac-
tices. Finally, whilst offering its own individuality
Singapore’s regulatory and institutional environ-
ment overlaps with regulations and requirements
observed in major international capital markets.
This assists, therefore, in generalising findings
from our study to other nations and regions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next section outlines the extant literature
associated with voluntary disclosure and informa-
tion asymmetry. This is followed in Section 3 with
the formal development of testable hypotheses.
The research method is discussed in Section 4 with
sample selection, descriptive and statistical results
reported in Section 5. Discussion and conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
2. Literature review: voluntary disclosure
and information asymmetry
Prior research implies intellectual capital resource-
rich firms exhibit more volatile market values and
are subject to a higher degree of information asym-
metry. Aboody and Lev (2000), for example, report
that intangibles (an intellectual capital component)
contribute positively to information asymmetry
particularly amongst research and development
(R&D) intensive firms. Consequently, informed
investors achieve abnormal returns (Aboody and
Lev, 2000). Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and
Lev (2001) also attribute widening bid-ask spreads
to information asymmetry. To compensate, in-
vestors require higher returns thus driving up the
cost of capital.
With respect to intellectual capital Van der
Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra (2001) report that a
lack of disclosure related to this pivotal resource
increases investors’ risk perception. They (Van der
Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001: 457) argue ‘a
lack of information about investments in intellec-
tual capital could lead to an underestimation of fu-
ture earnings’ and, thereby, increases the cost of
capital. Chan et al. (2001) provide similar findings
regarding R&D arguing that lack of disclosure in-
creases the degree of uncertainty (or perceived
risk) for R&D intensive firms. Consequently, re-
turn volatility intensifies with greater R&D expen-
ditures that are supported by low disclosures.
Again, higher cost of capital results. Chan et al.,
2001: 2454 argue ‘even if market prices on aver-
age incorporate the future benefits from R&D, the
lack of accounting information on such an impor-
tant intangible asset may impose real costs on in-
vestors through increased volatility.’
To reduce investors’ perceived risk and firm
value volatility, various studies (e.g. Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991; Elliot and Jacobson, 1994; Coles
et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997, 2006; Sengupta, 1998)
suggest greater disclosure decreases the required
return by investors. Diamond and Verrecchia
(1991) and Zhang (2001) develop theoretical mod-
els demonstrating the relations between voluntary
disclosure and a firm’s cost of capital. Diamond
and Verrecchia (1991) conclude increased volun-
tary disclosure results in a reduction in the infor-
mation asymmetry component of the cost of
capital. Information asymmetry arises as a result
of the market participants having different levels
of information. Zhang (2001), meanwhile, posits
private information production by investors leads
to a widening information gap between informed
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 411
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and uninformed investors, resulting in increased
cost of capital. Firms can reduce this information
asymmetry and, thereby, lower their cost of capital
by increasing the level of voluntary disclosure.
Consistent with these views, Lev (1992) also as-
serts that the existence of a permanent information
gap between outsiders and insiders creates the
need for a systematic disclosure strategy by firms.
Similarly, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) explored
the notion that a firm’s commitment to greater dis-
closure should lower the information asymmetry
component of the firm’s cost of capital. Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000) contend that to overcome the re-
luctance of potential investors to hold firm shares
in illiquid markets, firms must issue capital at a
discount leading to fewer proceeds to the firm and,
thus, higher cost of capital. Empirical results from
Botosan (2000) support this view. Botosan (2000)
found the cost of equity capital decreased with in-
creases in the level of two categories of informa-
tion: forward looking information (forecasts of
sales, profits and capital expenditure) and key non-
financial statistics (order backlogs, market share
and growth in units sold). An important implica-
tion of Botosan (2000), therefore, is there is room
for improvement in the voluntary disclosure by all
firms, especially in the forward looking and non-
financial categories.
Healy and Palepu (1993) argue corporate man-
agers issuing equity (or acquiring another compa-
ny) would consider it important for investors to
have a favourable perception of the issuer (or ac-
quirer). Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that 
entrepreneurs seeking external financing have in-
centives to make voluntary disclosure to mitigate
information asymmetry problems. Empirical evi-
dence of analysts’ ratings of disclosure supports
the view that firms issuing securities provide
greater disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). In
later work, Lang and Lundholm (1997) document
a significant increase in disclosure beginning six
months prior to the issue of equity, particularly for
items over which management has greater discre-
tion. Healy and Palepu (1993) also suggest 
managers can improve investor communication 
by developing disclosure strategies that help in-
vestors understand managers’ business objectives.
Voluntary disclosures could include articulation of
the firm’s long-term strategy, specification of non-
financial leading indicators useful in judging the
effectiveness of the strategy implementation, dis-
cussion of the leading indicators and outlines of
present and future joint ventures, strategic al-
liances and partnerships.6
In the IPO context Leland and Pyle (1977) es-
tablish a simple model of capital structure and fi-
nancial equilibrium in which entrepreneurs seek
financing of projects whose true characteristics are
known only to them. Allen and Faulhaber (1989)
assert that an important issue in signalling models
is whether the signal being examined would be
used if the firm had a wider choice of available
signals. IPOs can signal their quality with several
variables other than price such as underwriter
choice (Booth and Smith, 1986) and auditor
(Titman and Trueman, 1986). Allen and Faulhaber
(1989) argue price is likely to be just one of sever-
al signals used to convey information. Ownership
retention is frequently cited as a prime signal of an
IPO’s quality (Jog and McConomy, 2003).
Gonedes (1978), for example, argues IPO man-
agers will use their ownership retention as a signal
to complement voluntary disclosures (such as that
related to intellectual capital) made in the prospec-
tus. By retaining a higher ownership percentage
post-listing, pre-IPO owners signal to investors the
firm’s quality by accepting greater risk rather that
diversifying their interests by retaining less inter-
est in a single entity.
Whilst there appears a general consensus that
voluntary disclosure benefits firms accessing cap-
ital markets, there are disincentives for managers
to make full disclosure. This is because such dis-
closure would contain proprietary information that
would undermine the firm’s competitive position
(Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1983). Empirical studies
of the impact of proprietary costs suggest disclo-
sure is hampered by proprietary costs. Scott (1994)
carried out an empirical investigation of the pro-
prietary cost implications of defined benefit pen-
sion plan (DBPP) disclosures in Canada. He
(Scott, 1994) found a significant negative associa-
tion between the probability of a firm disclosing
pension plan information and the potential propri-
etary costs attached to its labour relations. The
larger the proprietary cost, the greater the decrease
in firm value, and the greater the incentive not to
disclose. Guo et al. (2004) examine the impact of
various competitive costs on the extent of product-
related information disclosed by biotech IPOs in
prospectuses. They (Guo et al., 2004) find biotech
firms operate in a highly competitive environment
and, therefore, are reluctant to disclose product-re-
lated information with high proprietary costs.
An entity’s corporate governance structure may
mitigate the disincentive to voluntarily disclose
key information with high proprietary costs.
Stronger corporate governance mechanisms are
thought to lower the cost of equity by reducing 
the cost of external monitoring by outside in-
vestors. Lombardo and Pagano (2002), for exam-
ple, postulate that investors need to incur external
monitoring costs to ensure a given pay-off from
412 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 Disclosure on issues such as present and future joint ven-
tures, strategic alliance and partnerships or a firm’s long-term
strategy are representative of disclosures that would fall with-
in the scope of intellectual capital.
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management. Additional monitoring costs are
compensated by a higher required rate of return.
External investors are likely to demand a lower re-
quired rate of return from firms with better corpo-
rate governance. This is because they can spend
less time and resources on monitoring the manage-
ment. Corporate governance can also reduce the
cost of equity by limiting opportunistic insider
trading, thereby, reducing information asymmetry.
Battacharya and Daouk (2002), for example, find
the cost of equity in a country decreases signifi-
cantly after the first prosecution under insider trad-
ing laws. If corporate governance mechanisms
reduce the cost of capital then this provides greater
scope for firms to voluntarily disclose more infor-
mation even in light of high proprietary costs.
Recent evidence from the UK suggests that
stronger corporate governance structures are asso-
ciated with increased intellectual capital disclosure
(Li et al., 2008).
3. Hypothesis development
The bulk of early empirical studies examined in-
tellectual capital disclosure in the context of annu-
al reports (Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan,
2001; Beaulieu et al., 2002) with some more recent
work undertaking comparative analysis across in-
ternational boundaries (Bozzolan et al., 2006;
Vergauwen and van Alem, 2005). Only a few stud-
ies have considered intellectual capital disclosure
in IPO prospectuses (Guo et al., 2004; Bukh et al.,
2005a). Bukh (2003: 51–52) states ‘the prospectus
indicates which type of information is selected by
a company and its advisers for the best possible vi-
sualisation of the company’s value creation poten-
tial in relation to investors and analysts because
the prospectus intends to prove continued growth
and increased shareholder wealth’. Bukh (2003)
concludes that the inclusion of information on in-
tellectual capital in prospectuses is an indication
that companies and their advisers believe this type
of information is important in the capital market’s
assessment of the value of the company.
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997, 2006;
Sengupta, 1998) it is our general contention that
voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital infor-
mation will reduce a firm’s cost of capital. As per
Section 2 discussion, we contend that within an
IPO setting, the extent of intellectual capital dis-
closure depends upon signalling mechanisms, pro-
prietary costs and the firm’s corporate governance
structure. Specifically, we propose since intellec-
tual capital disclosures are not as easily interpret-
ed by investors (given the lack of a recognised
reporting framework), management must incur
costly signals such as higher fractional ownership
post-listing to complement direct disclosure sig-
nals (Hughes, 1986). Firms entering highly com-
petitive industries, however, may elect to restrict
voluntary disclosures (Darrough and Stoughton,
1990), particularly those associated with intellec-
tual capital (Guo et al., 2004), even with high 
levels of ownership retention. Finally, strong cor-
porate governance structures may override high
proprietary costs negative influence associated
with disclosure (such as intellectual capital infor-
mation) leading to increased reporting (La Porta 
et al., 1997; 1998).
Formal hypotheses to test our general conjecture
of ownership retention, proprietary costs and cor-
porate governance structure influences are devel-
oped in the following sub-sections.
3.1. Ownership retention
Certo et al. (2001) argue two central tenets of
signalling theory are: (1) a signal must be observ-
able and known prior to the IPO; and (2) the signal
must be more costly for lower quality IPO firms to
mimic. We take the perspective that the proportion
of shares retained by the original owners is a sig-
nal observable in the prospectus document and one
lower quality firms find costly to imitate.
Specifically, owners of low quality firms would
want to diversify as much personal risk as possible
by attempting to sell as many of their IPO shares
as possible (Downes and Heinkel, 1982).
Leland and Pyle (1977) developed an equilibri-
um signalling model which predicts the behaviour
of the entrepreneur faced with information asym-
metry. In Leland and Pyle’s (1977) model, it is im-
plied that the entrepreneur’s willingness to invest
in his own project signals to the market that the
project is of good quality. It is costly for the entre-
preneur to retain a significant ownership stake in
the firm as this action would preclude the entre-
preneur from diversifying his personal investment
portfolio. Therefore, the entrepreneur will only re-
tain a significant ownership interest if expected fu-
ture cash flows are higher relative to the current
firm value (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Rational in-
vestors observe fractional ownership retained as a
signal of firm value.
Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) argue that entrepre-
neurs disclose information that signals their pri-
vate knowledge of the firm in order to add
credibility to the basic valuation parameters con-
tained in the prospectus (information on assets,
historical profitability, economic prospects, invest-
ment plans, etc.). Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) also
found that fractional ownership of the firm by the
original pre-issue shareholders is a major sig-
nalling mechanism. Their (Firth and Liau-Tan,
1998) findings indicate the level of ownership re-
tained by pre-IPO owners is used as a complemen-
tary signal. Research on intellectual capital
disclosure determinants is scarce. Similarly, re-
search on intellectual capital underpinned by sig-
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 413
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nalling theory is virtually non-existent. Bukh et al.
(2005a) is one exception reporting that the extent
of managerial ownership prior to the IPO is signif-
icantly associated with the level of intellectual
capital disclosure. Firms where management had
an ownership interest upon listing disclosed more
intellectual capital information (Bukh et al.,
2005a).
Overall, the IPO literature implies ownership re-
tention is a key signal to the market of a firm’s
quality. A good quality IPO, however, is likely to
use multiple signals such as greater voluntary dis-
closure to entice investors to view it favourably
(Jog and McConomy, 2003). Based on this prem-
ise, good quality IPOs (proxied by higher levels of
ownership retention) and specifically their direc-
tors are more likely to provide greater disclosure to
substantiate the value of the IPO. Therefore the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H1 There is a positive association between the
extent of intellectual capital disclosure and
the level of ownership retention at the IPO.
3.2. Proprietary costs
Proprietary information is ‘information whose
disclosure reduces the present value of cash flows
of the firm endowed with the information’ (Dye
1986: 331). For this study, proprietary costs are
viewed as a moderating variable given the highly
proprietary nature of intellectual capital disclo-
sure. That is, the impact of ownership retention on
the level of intellectual capital disclosure will be
moderated (negative direction) by the existence of
proprietary costs for the IPO firm.
Theoretical models developed by Verrecchia
(1983) suggest the threshold level of disclosure in-
creases as the proprietary costs increase.
Verrecchia (1983) suggests the nature of competi-
tion is pertinent in determining the level of disclo-
sure. For example, product market competition
may provide disincentives for voluntary disclosure
(Guo et al., 2004). Further, Darrough and
Stoughton (1990) assert that while voluntary infor-
mation aids the capital market in evaluating the
firm’s value more accurately, such disclosure
could compromise the firm’s competitive position
by revealing strategic information to potential
competitors.
Beaulieu et al. (2002) find a positive relationship
between the size of Swedish publicly listed firms
and the total amount of intellectual capital provid-
ed in their respective annual reports. It is speculat-
ed that the lack of disclosure amongst smaller
firms on intellectual capital matters could be due
to threats of competitive disadvantage (Beaulieu et
al., 2002). Williams (2001), meanwhile, finds that
when intellectual capital performance7 is too high,
disclosure is reduced. The negative association
supports the notion that firms reduce intellectual
capital disclosures when performance reaches key
threshold levels for fear of eroding competitive ad-
vantages (Williams, 2001). A recent study of
biotech IPOs by Guo et al. (2004) investigates the
impact of several competitive cost proxies on the
extent of product-related information disclosed.
Results indicate disclosure levels are significantly
higher for firms with patent protection for their
products compared to firms with no patent protec-
tion. Similar results are yielded for the other vari-
ables such as product development stage and
venture capital backing (Guo et al., 2004).
Given the proprietary nature of intellectual capi-
tal information and the implications of prior 
studies, it is expected that firms with higher pro-
prietary costs will result in a weakening of the pos-
itive association between ownership retention and
the level of intellectual capital disclosure. This
leads to the second hypothesis:
H2 The positive association between the extent
of intellectual capital disclosure and the level
of ownership retention will be weaker for
firms with higher levels of proprietary costs.
3.3. Corporate governance structure
Prominent work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
highlights the potential association between corpo-
rate governance and disclosure patterns. Recent
studies suggest board independence is a specific
feature of corporate governance that affects corpo-
rate disclosures. Using data from Singapore, Eng
and Mak (2003) hypothesised a positive associa-
tion between the proportion of outside directors
and the level of voluntary disclosure. Chen and
Jaggi (2000) find comprehensive disclosures are
positively related to the proportion of independent
non-executive directors on corporate boards. Li et
al. (2008) find a positive association between the
proportion of independent directors and intellectu-
al capital disclosure in the UK. These results sug-
gest external directors play a complementary role
to disclosure.
Gompers (1995) argues that in the presence of
information asymmetry which is prevalent for
start-up firms, an independent board structure is
essential for effective monitoring. As a minimum
the independent board may signal the presence of
an effective monitoring mechanism, thereby, en-
hancing firm value (Certo et al., 2001). Fama and
Jensen (1983) posit a board comprised mainly of
outside directors may promote the implementation
414 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
7 Intellectual capital performance is the increase or decline
across a period of time in a firm’s (a) wealth, (b) efficient out-
put of physical assets; (c) competitive advantage; and (d)
value of other types of capital that results from the activities
and actions undertaken by corporate management to efficient-
ly utilise, manage and develop the firm’s intellectual capital
resources (Williams, 2001).
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of effective controls over reporting. Gul and
Leung (2004), meanwhile, examined the linkages
between board leadership structure in terms of
CEO duality (CEO who jointly serves as board
chair), the proportion of expert outside directors
on the board and voluntary corporate disclosures.
They (Gul and Leung, 2004) find CEO duality is
associated with lower levels of voluntary corpo-
rate disclosures. However, the negative CEO dual-
ity/voluntary disclosure association is weaker for
firms with a higher proportion of expert outside di-
rectors on the board.
Based on the above discussion this study postu-
lates that sound corporate governance features
(such as board independence) negate the weaken-
ing effects of proprietary costs on the level of in-
tellectual capital disclosure in IPO prospectuses.
This leads to the third and final hypothesis:
H3 The interaction effect of proprietary costs on
the association between the extent of the in-
tellectual capital disclosure and ownership
retention will be weaker for firms with a
stronger corporate governance structure.
4. Research method
This section outlines the proxy measures for the
dependent, independent and control variables, and
defines the main statistical model used to test the
hypotheses.
4.1. Dependent variable metric
Prior research examining disclosure typically
rely on either a: (1) researcher constructed disclo-
sure index (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Guo et al., 2004);
or (2) publicly available disclosure quality indica-
tor (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1997;
Sengupta, 1998). No public intellectual capital dis-
closure indicator is presently available; thus, we
construct our own index. Initial selection of intel-
lectual capital disclosure items is based on three
prior indices (Williams, 2001; Beaulieu et al.,
2002; Bukh et al., 2005a) previously used to meas-
ure intellectual capital disclosure in either annual
reports or IPO prospectuses (Bukh et al., 2005a).
All three indices were reviewed to determine over-
lapping items. A composite disclosure index com-
prising 89 items is formed. A further eight items
(not contained in any of the three noted indices) is
added after further consideration of the Singapore
business environment and recent developments in
intellectual capital research and practice. All 97
items are then comprehensively scrutinised for rel-
evance and suitability to the study’s objectives.
Scrutiny involved discussions between the re-
searchers, intellectual capital scholars and practi-
tioners, corporate executives and accounting
practitioners. From this extensive review 16 items
were excluded. This left a final disclosure index
comprising 81 items covering six major cate-
gories: (1) human resources; (2) customers; (3) in-
formation technology; (4) processes; (5) R&D;
and (6) strategic statements. The full index is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
To minimise scoring subjectivity we use an un-
weighted8 dichotomous scale (one (1) if item dis-
closed, otherwise zero (0)) to score each item.9 An
IPO’s intellectual capital disclosure (ICDiscj) level
is defined as the ratio of items disclosed in the
prospectus of IPO j to the total number disclosure
items applicable to IPO j. The ratio, as a percent-
age, is arithmetically defined as:
Where:
DItemi = IC disclosure index item disclosed by
IPOj in its prospectus;
ADItemi = IC disclosure index item applicable to
IPOj;
i = IC disclosure index item; and
j = IPO firm.
4.2. Independent and moderating variables 
metrics
4.2.1. Ownership retention
Consistent with the IPO literature we define
ownership retention (denoted αj) as the percentage
of outstanding common shares retained by pre-
IPO shareholders to total shares outstanding after
the IPO (e.g. Clarkson et al., 1992; Firth and Liau-
Tan, 1998). For purposes of the regression analy-
sis a transformation based on the natural logarithm
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 415
8 An unweighted or weighted scoring approach can be used
for scoring. Prior research (Cooke, 1989; Marston and
Shrives, 1991; Ho and Williams, 2003) reports either approach
typically yields similar results.
9 Various steps were taken to ensure consistency in scoring
of intellectual capital disclosure in each prospectus examined.
For example, before commencing scoring of all the prospec-
tuses a random sample of 20 were scored by each author.
Scores were then compared and any discrepancies noted. The
authors then discussed any major discrepancies to resolve any
noted differences in scoring. The review of coding and dis-
cussion of discrepancies was concluded again once all
prospectuses had been coded by both authors. An additional
check for consistent scoring by the authors involved the use of
several independent coders throughout the coding process.
That is, an independent coder was given a randomly selected
sample of prospectuses (completed by the authors) for coding.
Results of the coding by the independent coder were then
compared to the two authors for any major discrepancies.
Results of coding by the independent coders did not yield any
major differences with results developed by the two authors.
Independent coders included accounting professionals, in-
vestors familiar with IPO prospectuses and academic scholars.
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of αj is performed. The transformation defined by
the equation αj + Ln(1 – αj) is based on the ap-
proach of Downes and Heinkel (1982) and consis-
tent with the technique as used by and defined by
Jog and McConomy (2003). The transformation is
performed to reduce any anomalies in the distribu-
tion of ownership retention. The post-transforma-
tion proxy values are denoted as EDORj.
4.2.2. Proprietary costs
Competitiveness in a given industry has been ap-
plied as a proxy for the proprietary costs faced by
a firm in prior literature (e.g. Verrecchia, 1983;
Berger and Hann, 2007).10 Consistent with this lit-
erature we use a Herfindahl Index as the proxy
measure for proprietary costs as defined by the fol-
lowing technique:
Where:
HerfIndConj = measure of the industry concen-
tration of the industryl to which
firmj is entering.
MarketSharej = Market share of firmj within in-
dustryl to which it is entering.
Salesj = Sales of firmj for year immedi-
ately prior to its IPO as reported
in the IPO prospectus.
Saleskl = Sales as reported in the annual
report of firmk in industryl for
year immediately prior to the
IPO of firmj entering industryl.
N = number of firms in industryl.
4.2.3. Corporate governance structure
For this study, a composite measure of corporate
governance (defined as CGScorej) is developed
such that IPOj is given a score of one (1) (other-
wise zero (0)) for each of the following conditions
in the corporate governance structure met at the
time of listing: (a) number of independent direc-
tors on the board of directors at time of IPO ex-
ceeds the mandatory minimum; (b) the same
individual does not occupy the roles of chairman
of the board and chief executive officer; and (c)
the chairman of the board of directors is a non-
executive director independent of management.
The CGScorej value for IPOj, therefore, ranges
from 0–3.
4.3. Control variables
To formally test if intellectual capital disclosures
assist investors in determining the value of an IPO
beyond typical and complementary disclosures,
and other signalling methods available to issuers
we include a number of control variables into the
analysis. Firth and Liau-Tan (1998) report a sig-
nificant association between underpricing and an
issuer’s selection of an auditor. A higher quality
IPO signals key information to market participants
about the IPO’s value by engaging an auditor with
high reputation capital (Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998).
Chen and Mohan (2002) put forward a similar ar-
gument for underwriter prestige. To control for the
possible compounding signalling effects of auditor
reputation we include a control variable denoted
Audj. Following prior research (e.g. Firth and
Liau-Tan, 1998; Jog and McConomy, 2003) IPO j
is scored one (1) if engaging a Big Four11 audit
firm at the time of listing; otherwise IPO j is
scored zero (0).
We also control for underwriter prestige consis-
tent with past IPO research (e.g. Chen and Mohan,
2002). Without any defined ranking of underwrit-
ers in Singapore and some data availability issues
we are not able to measure underwriter prestige
using many of the techniques applied using data
from the US. Nonetheless, we use a modified ap-
proach of Johnson and Miller (1988) and
Megginson and Weiss (1991). Specifically, the
prestige (Prek,i) of underwriter k in year i is meas-
ured as the ratio of the number of IPOs underwrit-
416 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
10 Several approaches have been applied in the literature to
measure proprietary costs. Whilst the main results reported in
this study focus on industry competitiveness (as measured by
the Herfindahl Index) we did consider alternative proxies for
proprietary costs. For example, we also used (a) the level of
research and development and (b) the number of copyrights
and patents. Tests using the alternative measures yield results
consistent with those using the Herfindahl Index though it is
noted the significance of the association between proprietary
costs and level of intellectual capital disclosure is slightly
stronger for the alternative measures. However, due to con-
cerns with consistency of data to measure the amount of R&D,
and the number of copyrights and patents the authors elected
to use (and report main finding) the more conservative
Herfindahl Index due to greater confidence in the consistency
of the data used in the measure.
11 The term Big Four is not entirely applicable across the
full observation period. In 1997 and 1998 it was widely
recognised that the audit market worldwide was dominated
by six major audit firms (dubbed the Big Six). At the start of
1999 two of the Big Six (Coopers and Lybrand and Price
Waterhouse) had merged to form PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(or PWC). For IPOs listing in 1997 and 1998 that engaged
one of the Big Six firms as the external auditor were scored
one (1); otherwise zero (0). In 2002 the Big Five became the
Big Four after the demise of Arthur Andersen. Thus, for our
study IPOs listing in 1999 to 2001 are scored one (1) if the
IPO j engages an audit firm comprising the Big Five; other-
wise IPO j is scored zero (0). From 2002 onwards the Big
Four classification is used such that if the IPO j engages an
audit firm comprising the Big Five; otherwise IPO j is scored
zero (0). Whilst the term Big Four is not applicable for the en-
tire period we solely use the phrase Big Four in the main text
to avoid confusion.
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ten by underwriter k in year i to the total number
of IPOs in year i. Underwriters with higher Prek ra-
tios in year i have higher levels of prestige capital
at stake in year i relative to other underwriters and
will seek to reduce underpricing (Jog and
McConomy, 2003). For the control variable Undj a
score of one (1) is assigned to IPO j listing in year
i if the underwriter k used by IPO j is one of two
underwriters with the highest Prek ratios in year i.
All other IPOs are scored zero (0).
Prior research indicates litigation risk may influ-
ence underpricing (Hughes and Thakor, 1992;
Keloharju, 1993). Whilst litigation risk in
Singapore is low, legal issues related to an IPO re-
main highly complex. To signal to the market in-
formation about the IPO’s commitment to
avoiding legal disruptions (during and after list-
ing), promoters of a high quality IPO may be in-
clined to engage solicitors that are highly
conversant in the IPO process. For their part, so-
licitors routinely dealing in IPO matters have an
incentive to deal predominantly with high quality
firms to protect their reputation capital as leading
legal advisors on IPO issues. There is no definitive
method to measure solicitor reputation. Hence, for
this study we apply the approach as for under-
writer prestige in following Johnson and Miller
(1988) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). That is,
the reputation (Repk,i) of solicitor firm k in year i is
measured as the ratio of the number of IPOs un-
dertaken by solicitor firm k as the lead solicitor
firm in year i to the total number of IPOs in year i.
Solicitor firms with higher Repk ratios in year i will
have higher levels of reputation capital at stake in
year i and will seek to reduce underpricing. For the
control variable Solj a score of one (1) is assigned
to IPO j listing in year i if the solicitor firm k used
is one of two solicitor firms with the highest Repk
ratios in year i. All other IPOs are scored zero (0).
Researchers (Koh and Walter, 1989; Kim and
Ritter, 1999; Su and Fleisher, 1998) suggest the
level of ex ante uncertainty is likely to be less in
highly leveraged IPOs. Debt, therefore, may act as
a credible signal of the IPO’s quality. With higher
debt the threat of bankruptcy imposes harsher
budget constraints on managers, limits manage-
ment’s control over cash flows, and raises the risk
to a firm’s undiversified stock ownership (Levis,
1990). Lower quality firms are less likely to be
willing to assume the additional concerns associat-
ed with high debt as they have a higher chance of
being forced into bankruptcy. To control for sig-
nalling effects of leverage (Levj) we use the book
value of total debt divided by the book value of the
total assets of firm j as reported in the last financial
period preceding the IPO.
We also control for bonus or stock option plans
in executive compensation packages as their pres-
ence suggests a higher degree of information
asymmetry. This presumption is based on the 
premiss that bonus or stock option plans are con-
tingent on future net income and share price per-
formance. This is likely to influence the incumbent
management’s time horizon. On average, IPO
managers with bonus and stock options as part of
their executive compensation packages have
greater access to private information about future
earnings than other stakeholders. IPO managers
can use their inside information to optimise any
bonus or stock option provisions to benefit their
own self-interests rather than the interests of future
shareholders. If outside stakeholders have the
same information as IPO managers this may influ-
ence valuations of the IPO. For the control vari-
able ExeCPj IPOs with a bonus or stock option
plan as part of executive compensation packages is
scored one (1), otherwise zero (0).
Finally, we include two controls for ex ante un-
certainty: (1) offering size (LnGPj) is measured as
the natural logarithm of gross proceeds of the IPO
as per the prospectus; and (2) prior operating his-
tory of the IPO (Agej) is the natural logarithm of
the number of days from the date of the firm’s in-
corporation to the IPO date. Beatty and Ritter
(1986) find when using the inverse of the gross
proceeds from the offering (or one plus the number
of uses of the proceeds) as a measure of ex ante
uncertainty, smaller offerings are more ‘specula-
tive’. Prior research (e.g. Beatty, 1989; Clarkson,
1994; Clarkson and Merkley, 1994) also shows a
negative and significant association between firm
age and underpricing.
Proxy measures for all variables are defined and
summarised in Table 1.
4.4. Main model specification and statistical tests
This study uses various statistical tests (uni-
variate and tests of correlation) to analyse the
data. The hypotheses are tested formally through
multiple regression analysis. To formally test the
three hypotheses developed for this study three
specific regression models are estimated as fol-
lows:
ICDiscj = λj + β1EDORj + γ1Audj + γ2Undj + (1)
γ3Solj + γ4Levj + γ5ExeCPj + 
γ6LnGPj + γ7Agej + ηj
ICDiscj = λj + β1EDORj + β2HerfIndConj + (2)
β3EDORj*HerfIndConj + γ1Audj +
γ2Undj + γ3Solj + γ4Levj + γ5ExeCPj +
γ6LnGPj + γ7Agej + ηj
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 417
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418 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 1
Summary variables and their proxy measure determination
Variable title Variable description
ICDiscj Ratio of the number of intellectual capital items i disclosed by IPO firm j in
their prospectus to the number of intellectual capital items i applicable to
firm j expressed as a percentage.
EDORj αj is calculated as α = (N – Np – Ns)/N where N = number of common 
outstanding shares after the IPO of firm j, Np = number of primary common 
outstanding shares offered via the IPO of firm j and Ns = number of 
secondary common outstanding shares offered via the IPO of firm j (note
that αj is expressed as a ratio in isolation). For the regression analysis 
(and application of the interaction terms) a transformation based on the 
natural logarithm αj is then performed based on the following equation: 
αj + ln(1 – αj). This approach is consistent with prior literature (e.g.
Downes and Heinkel, 1982; Clarkson et al., 1992; Jog and McConomy,
2003). EDORj is used to denote the outcome of the transformation.
HerfIndConj
Where: HerfIndCon = measure of the industry concentration of the 
industryl to which firmj is entering; MarketSharej = Market share of 
firmj within industryl to which it is entering; Salesj = Sales of firmj for 
year immediately prior to its IPO as reported in the IPO prospectus; 
Saleskl = Sales as reported in the annual report of firmk in industryl
for year immediately prior to the IPO of firmj entering industryl; and 
N = number of firms in industryl.
CGScorej Firmj is given a score of one (1) (otherwise zero (0)) for each of the 
following conditions in the corporate governance structure met at the time
of the IPO: (a) number of independent directors on the board of directors 
at time of IPO exceeds the mandatory minimum; (b) the same individual
does not occupy the roles of chairman of the board and chief executive 
officer; and (c) the chairman of the board of directors is a non-executive 
director independent of management. Firmj score can range from 0–3.
EDORj*HerfIndConj Two-way interaction term. Definitions for EDORj and HerfIndConj are 
defined above.
EDORj*CGScorej Two-way interaction term. Definitions for EDORj and CGScorej are 
defined above.
HerfIndConj*CGScorej Two-way interaction term. Definitions for HerfIndConj and CGScorej are
defined above.
EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej Three-way interaction term. Definitions for EDORj, HerfIndConj and
CGScorej are defined above.
Audj An indicator variable where IPO firm j is scored one (1) if it engages a 
Big Four audit firm as the auditor; otherwise scored zero (0).
Undj An indicator variable where IPO firm j is scored one (1) if it engages either 
of the top two underwriter firms (based on frequency) in the year of the 
firm’s IPO; otherwise scored zero (0).
Solj An indicator variable where IPO firm j is scored one (1) if it engages either 
of the top two solicitor firms (based on frequency) invited to the IPO in 
the year of the firm’s IPO; otherwise scored zero (0).
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ICDiscj = λj + β1EDORj + β2HerfIndConj + (3)
β3EDORj*HerfIndConj + β4CGScorej +
β5EDORj*CGScorej +
β6HerfIndConj*CGScorej + 
7β7EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej +
γ1Audj + γ2Undj + γ3Solj + γ4Levj +
γ5ExeCPj + γ6LnGPj + γ7Agej + ηj
Where:
Formal definitions are presented in Table 1;
λj = the coefficient on the intercept term;
βi = the coefficients 1–7 on the independent and
interaction variables;
γi = the coefficients 1–7 on the independent and
interaction variables; and
ηj = the error term.
Support for H1 acceptance is derived if the coef-
ficient β1 on the independent variable EDORj is
found to be statistically significant at conventional
levels and with a positive directional sign in re-
gressions based on Equations 1, 2 and 3. In the
context of H2, this hypothesis will be supported if
the coefficient β3 on the interaction variable
EDORj*HerfIndConj is statistically significant at
conventional levels and the directional sign is neg-
ative in regressions based on Equations 2 and 3.
Finally, there will be support to accept H3 if the
coefficient β7 on the interaction variable
EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej is statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels with a positive di-
rectional sign in regressions based on Equations 3.
5. Sample and results
5.1. Sample selection and industry distribution
Our initial sample comprises SGX IPOs satisfy-
ing the following criteria:
I. The IPO applied for initial listing on the SGX
between 1 January 1997 and 31 December
2006 (based on listings from the SGX).
II. The IPO issued equity shares not previously
publicly traded, and whose fiscal year end was
prior to or on 31 December 2006.
III. The IPO is not a life investment fund, stock
index fund, real estate unit fund or limited
partnership.
IV. The IPO did not issue preferred shares only.
V. The IPO did not provide a prospectus as part
of a cross-listing arrangement.
Of the 516 firms applying for a SGX listing be-
tween 1997 and 2006, 444 meet our prescribed cri-
teria. Of those not meeting the criteria 27 were
seasoned offerings, 27 unit fund related issues and
five issuing only preferred shares. Another 13
IPOs are excluded: (i) due to insufficient prospec-
tus information to construct the proxy measures; or
(ii) incomplete prospectuses to enable measure-
ment of intellectual capital disclosures. Our final
useable sample comprises 86.05% of total IPOs
during the review period. A breakdown of the sam-
ple selection by year is reported in Table 2, Panel
A. The annual breakdown indicates IPO activity is
particularly high during two sub-periods: (1)
1999–2000; and (2) 2004–2006. Strong IPO activ-
ity during 1999–2000 is synonymous with the
hype surrounding the ‘Internet Bubble’ as found in
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 419
Table 1
Summary variables and their proxy measure determination (continued)
Variable title Variable description
Levj Ratio of book value of total debt (expressed in Singapore Dollars (SGD))
for IPO firm j to total book value of total assets (expressed in (SGD)) of
IPO firm j in the accounting period immediately preceding the IPO as per
the prospectus.
ExeCPj An indicator variable where the IPO firm j is scored one (1) if the firm has
a bonus or stock option component as part of its executive compensation
plan; otherwise scored zero (0).
LnGPj Natural logarithm of the gross proceeds (based on the gross proceeds of the
IPO as per the prospectus) to be received by firm j from the IPO (expressed
in SGD).
Agei Natural logarithm of the number of days from the date of incorporation of
firm j to the date of the IPO.
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other major capital markets (Ljungqvist and
Wilhelm, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Ofek
and Richardson, 2003). High IPO activity in
Singapore from 2004 through 2006 can be attrib-
uted, in part, to a growing enthusiasm for: (a) at-
tracting China-based firms; or (b) investment into
Singapore incorporated firms that are developing
and/or expanding operations in China. Low IPO
activity in 1997–1998 and 2001–2003 is likely due
to poor economic conditions.12
An industry breakdown (US SIC single-digit
classification) shown in Table 2, Panel B shows
nearly 50% of the IPOs representation were from
the manufacturing sector (i.e. 214 of 444 or
48.20%). The strong representation of IPOs from
the manufacturing sector is consistent with under-
lying dominance of this industry sector in
Singapore. The services sector is also strongly rep-
resented with 21.84% (i.e. 97 of 444) of the IPOs
being classified into this business sector. Given
Singapore’s lack of natural resources it is not sur-
prising few mining firms listed on the SGX (i.e. 3
or 0.68%). Mining sector firms listing on the SGX
generally had extensive mining operations in
Indonesia, Malaysia or Vietnam.
420 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 2
Breakdown of sample selection process
Panel A: Sample selection
Listing Reason for exclusion from sample Included in sample
Seasoned Fund Preferred Insufficient % Total
Year N offering typesΦ shares dataϕ N listing
1997 15 2 1 0 1 11 73.33
1998 23 2 0 0 1 20 86.96
1999 51 3 2 0 2 44 86.27
2000 82 7 5 3 4 63 76.83
2001 37 3 1 0 0 33 89.19
2002 33 2 3 0 1 27 81.82
2003 60 4 2 1 2 51 85.00
2004 80 2 0 1 0 77 96.25
2005 69 1 4 0 1 63 91.30
2006 66 1 9 0 1 55 83.33
Total 516 27 27 5 13 444 86.05
Panel B: Industry composition of sample
Code SIC industry class description N % Sample
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 7 1.58
B Mining 3 0.68
C Construction 24 5.41
D Manufacturing 214 48.20
E Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 41 9.23
F Wholesale Trade 30 6.75
G Retail Trade 15 3.38
H Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 9 2.03
I Services 97 21.84
J Public Administration 4 0.90
Total 444 100.00
Where:
Φ – Offerings categorised in this group included life investment funds, stock index funds and real estate funds
that issued unit trusts via the SGX.
ϕ – IPOs classified as ‘Insufficient Data’ typically included those where a verifiable copy of the original
prospectus could not be obtained, or IPOs where a prospectus was obtained but necessary information relevant
to this study (such as for determining key variables) was not available.
12 In late 1997, for example, Singapore (like other Asian na-
tions) was savaged by the Asian Financial Crisis that lingered
into 1998. Whilst in the midst of an economic recession in
2001–2002 Singapore’s economic prosperity was further
dampened by the SARS crisis.
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5.2. Descriptive results
Table 3, Panel A reports an annual breakdown of
the raw amount of intellectual capital disclosure.
Average raw total intellectual capital disclosure
rises yearly from 15.091 items in 1997 to a peak of
28.863 items in 2003 followed by a decline in
2004 (24.429 items) and 2005 (22.175 items) be-
fore a rebound in 2006 (26.145 items). An
ANOVA test (not tabulated) did not indicate sig-
nificant variations in the annual average total raw
intellectual capital disclosure across the study pe-
riod. Bukh et al. (2005a) is presently the only
study enabling any meaningful longitudinal com-
parison.13 They (Bukh et al., 2005a) report an an-
nual upward trend in IC disclosure in Danish IPO
prospectuses from 1990 to 1999 with a slight de-
cline in 2000 and 2001.14 Comparatively, average
raw intellectual capital disclosure for Singapore
IPOs is marginally below Danish IPOs from 1997
to 2001 (the period during which both studies
overlap).15
An annual raw disclosure breakdown by major
intellectual capital categories is also reported in
Table 3, Panel A.16 Changes in raw disclosure as-
sociated with human resource, customer and
process capital follows a similar path (i.e. upward
annually from 1997–2003 with a decline in 2004
and 2005, and then rising in 2006) to total raw in-
tellectual capital disclosure. Average raw disclo-
sure on information technology capital spiked in
1999 (1.159 items) followed by an annual decline.
Disclosure related to information technology capi-
tal again spikes in 2003 (0.882) before two further
years of moderation before a third spike in 2006
(0.891 items). This pattern of spikes followed by
declines could be systematic of fluctuations in ex-
penditure and attention to information technology
that could follow cyclical paths. Average raw
R&D capital disclosures fluctuated between 1997
and 2002 before a rise and stabilisation in 2003
and 2004. There is a dip in 2005 with a rebound in
the subsequent year. Besides two anomalies in
1997 and 2003 the average raw disclosure for
strategic capital is quite flat though with a sharp
rise in 2006 relative to prior years.
An annualised breakdown of average ICDiscj
scores is reported in Table 3, Panel B. Consistent
with average raw total disclosures the average
ICDiscj scores increased annually from 1997 to
2003 (18.631% to 35.633%) before a pullback in
2004 (30.159%) and 2005 (27.376%). This is fol-
lowed by an increase in 2006 (32.278%). An
ANOVA test (not tabulated) did not indicate sig-
nificant variations at conventional levels between
the annual average ICDiscj scores.
Descriptive statistics for the independent vari-
ables (based on pooled sample) are reported in
Table 3, Panel C.17 Statistical tests (not tabulated)
show only the mean annual values for EDORj and
Agei differ significantly. Of 2001 IPOs (and to
some degree 2002 IPOs) average retained owner-
ship and age is significantly higher than
2004–2005 IPOs. Poor economic conditions in
Singapore in 2001 may partially explain this ob-
servation. With the economy struggling, only high
quality firms (indicated by a higher level of 
retained ownership and/or a longer established
record) would have found it viable to list. A more
buoyant economy in 2004–2006 would have pro-
vided a higher likelihood of reasonable returns.
Thus, a higher number of lower-quality firms
and/or those with a shorter prior operating history
would have been attracted to list in 2004–2006 as
opposed to 2001. The average HerfIndConj score(0.192) indicates business sectors being entered by
IPOs between 1997 and 2006 were moderately to
highly concentrated. This result is consistent with
prior views that business sectors in Singapore are
dominated by large sector leaders that capture the
majority of sales turnover. The average corporate
governance score for the pooled sample (i.e.
2.321) implies that upon listing on the SGX IPOs
were, in general, well governed. However, de-
scriptive statistics for CGScorej also indicate vari-
ations in standards.
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13 Bukh et al., (2005b) measure IC disclosures of a sample
of Japanese firms using the Bukh et al., (2005a) index but only
for a single year (i.e. 2003). Strom (2005) also measures intel-
lectual capital disclosures in prospectuses of Swedish IPOs.
His index (Strom, 2005) comprises fewer items and focuses on
specific subsets of intellectual capital from Bukh et al.,
(2005a).
14 The upward trend is consistent with growth in the aware-
ness and attention to intellectual capital issue during the
1990s.
15 Data for the Bukh et al. (2005a) study is from 1990 to
2001. Whilst not a specific parallel to our study the Bukh 
et al. (2005a) study provides a basic benchmark.
16 As the number of items in each major category varies a
comparison of raw disclosure between categories is not pru-
dent. Caution should be taken if making any such comparison.
Due to difficulty in making such a comparison we do not pro-
vide any commentary in this paper on any cross-category
comparisons.
17 IPOs opting to disclose less intellectual capital informa-
tion in their prospectus may have different organisational
characteristics than IPOs disclosing more (Bukh et al., 2005a).
For instance, a smaller IPO may opt not to disclose as much
intellectual capital information due to the threat of competitive
pressures from larger firms. Larger IPOs, however, may not be
subject to this disincentive. Table 3, Panel A describes various
organisational characteristics for the pooled sample. Using the
median value (for the pooled sample and by year) for each or-
ganisational characteristic as the cut-off point we conducted
statistical tests to determine if the level of intellectual capital
disclosure may have been significantly influenced by relevant
firm-specific characteristics. Any significant variations noted
may have inferred possible self-selection bias. Between and
within tests (not tabulated for brevity) did not indicate any sig-
nificant differences in the level of intellectual capital disclo-
sure (for the pooled sample or individual years) due to the
firm-specific characteristics listed in Table 3, Panel A. Based
on these findings we conclude that self-selection bias is not a
significant concern with the sample.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Annualised breakdown of raw IC disclosure by major category
Year Total HRM CC ITC PC RandDC SC
1997 (n = 11) 15.091 6.636 1.636 0.818 1.818 0.545 3.636
1998 (n = 20) 16.000 5.100 1.800 0.050 2.000 1.750 5.300
1999 (n = 44) 19.205 6.909 1.977 1.159 2.364 1.841 4.955
2000 (n = 63) 20.714 7.730 2.222 0.635 2.397 2.286 5.444
2001 (n = 33) 20.576 8.394 1.848 0.394 2.606 1.727 5.606
2002 (n = 27) 23.000 9.074 3.148 0.111 2.889 2.185 5.593
2003 (n = 51) 28.863 10.098 4.686 0.882 3.353 2.745 7.098
2004 (n = 77) 24.429 9.416 2.403 0.494 3.312 2.883 5.922
2005 (n = 63) 22.175 8.413 1.952 0.540 2.921 2.587 5.762
2006 (n = 55) 26.145 9.218 3.527 0.891 3.364 3.200 5.945
Total (n = 444) 22.802 8.480 2.631 0.637 2.869 2.439 5.745
Panel B: Annualised breakdown of ICDiscj
Standard 25th 75th
Year Mean % deviation percentile Median percentile
1997 (n = 11) 18.631 3.763 16.049 19.753 20.988
1998 (n = 20) 19.753 5.650 14.815 18.519 23.148
1999 (n = 44) 23.709 6.592 20.370 23.457 27.160
2000 (n = 63) 25.573 5.978 20.988 24.691 29.630
2001 (n = 33) 25.402 5.711 20.988 24.691 28.395
2002 (n = 27) 28.395 4.926 25.926 27.160 33.333
2003 (n = 51) 35.633 7.230 31.173 35.802 40.741
2004 (n = 77) 30.159 7.025 24.691 29.630 35.494
2005 (n = 63) 27.376 6.835 22.395 27.115 31.752
2006 (n = 55) 32.278 6.911 26.498 31.992 41.643
Total (n = 444) 28.150 7.336 20.117 27.994 33.943
Panel C: Control variable descriptive statistics (N = 444)
Standard 25th 75th
Control variableΦ Mean deviation percentile Median percentile
αj 0.791 0.065 0.733 0.760 0.822
EDORj –0.744 0.212 –0.833 –0.642 –0.621
HerfIndConj 0.192 0.091 0.141 0.188 0.211
CGScorej 2.321 0.381 1.652 2.247 2.402
Audj 79.962
Undj 69.951
Solj 41.381
Levj 0.592 0.292 0.408 0.562 0.712
ExeCPj 47.224
Gross proceeds $40,150,708 $47,491,448 $4,600,130 $10,350,000 $68,221,000
LnGPj 16.606 0.988 15.242 16.587 17.006
Age in days 2,100 4,091 250 881 4,572
Agei 6.749 1.527 5.544 6.507 8.181
Where:
See Table 1 for definitions of variables.
‡ – Of all the dependent, independent and control variables ANOVA tests indicate only significant variations
in mean values between each year of the review period for EDORj and Agei.
Φ – The control variables are all shown in italics. Variables not in italics are supplementary information relat-
ed to respective control variables before transformation. For all control variables measured using a dichoto-
mous scale (i.e. Audj, Undj, Solj and ExeCPj) the value reported is the percentage of the sample that employed
the services of a Big Four audit firm, prestige underwriter and/or highly reputable solicitor firm, and those with
bonuses and stock options as a component of the executives compensation package. For example, 79.962% of
the sample (or 355 IPOs of 444) engaged a Big Four audit firm.
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5.3. Correlation matrix
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix with the
upper half reporting Pearson pairwise correlation
coefficients (crp), the lower half Spearman correla-
tion coefficients (crs). ICDiscj is positively signifi-
cantly correlated with EDORj (p<0.01, crp and crs).
The directional sign on both Pearson and
Spearman correlations is consistent with our ex-
pectations and other related work (e.g. Jog and
McConomy, 2003; Guo et al., 2004). ICDiscj is
also positively significantly correlated with
CGScorej (p<0.05, crp and crs). Again, these results
are consistent with our expectations.
ICDiscj is also positively significantly correlated
with: (a) Undj (p<0.01, crp and crs); (b) Levj(p<0.01, crp and crs); and (c) Agej (p<0.05, crp and
crs). Meanwhile, the dependent variable is nega-
tively significantly correlated with Solj (p<0.01,
crp and crs) and LnGPj (p<0.01, crp and crs).
Directional signs on all significant correlations 
between dependent and control variables are as 
expected (e.g. Firth and Liau-Tan, 1998; Jog and
McConomy, 2003). There are no meaningful cor-
relations between the independent variables that
imply any significant issues in interpreting multi-
ple regression results. Finally, significant correla-
tions between control variables are noted. The
maximum Pearson (Spearman) correlation being
between Levj and LnGPj (p<0.01, crp and crs) is
0.425 (0.451) is below critical levels (i.e. 0.8, see
Hair et al., 1995; Greene, 1999) for multicollinear-
ity to be a serious concern in OLS regression
analysis. Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores
also calculated (not tabulated) further indicated no
serious problems with multicollinearity.18
5.4. Regression findings
A series of OLS regressions are reported in 
Table 5. Base model results are reported in Panel 1
whilst regressions testing H1, H2 and H3 respec-
tively are shown in Panels 2, 3 and 4. Coefficients
on EDORj are positive and significant (p<0.05,
two-tailed significance) in the regressions reported
in Panels 2, 3 and 4. This result is consistent with
our expectations and supports the acceptance of
H1. The coefficients on HerfIndConj are negative
and significant (p<0.10, two-tailed significance) in
Panels 3 and 4 implying that IPOs entering more
concentrated business sectors reported less intel-
lectual capital information in their listing prospec-
tuses. The result of importance with respect to H2,
however, is the coefficients on the interaction term
EDORj*HerfIndConj where in Panels 3 and 4 they
are both negative and significant (p<0.05, two-
tailed significance). Results related to this interac-
tion term are consistent with the expectations of
H2. The coefficient on CGScorej is positive and
moderately significant (p<0.10, two-tailed signifi-
cance) in Panel 4 results. This result is consistent
with the expectation that better governance is 
likely to prompt greater transparency. For our
study the term of importance in Panel 4 is the 
coefficient on the three-way interaction term. The
result of importance in respect to H3, however, 
is the coefficients on the interaction term
EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej. Findings show
that whilst the directional sign on
EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej is as expected the
coefficient is insignificant. This result, therefore,
does not support the acceptance of H3.
With respect to the control variables coefficients
on Undj are positive and significant (p<0.01 Table
5, Panels 1–4, two-tailed significance). The posi-
tive and significant result suggests that IPOs en-
gaging a higher quality underwriter were likely to
disclose more information than counterparts using
the services of a lower quality underwriter. The 
additional disclosure could be the result of pres-
sure on the IPO from the high quality underwriter
seeking to preserve their reputation capital.
Conversely, coefficients on Solj are all negative
and significant (p<0.05, Table 5, Panels 1 and 2;
p<0.10, Table 5, Panels 3 and 4; two-tailed signif-
icance). Results for Solj appear contrary to a 
‘reputation capital’ proposition for additional dis-
closure. Rather, the negative and significant results
may imply IPOs engaging a high quality legal firm
may have been advised to limit excess disclosure
so as to avoid possible future litigation as over am-
bitious conclusions are drawn by investors from
greater disclosure. Consistent with expectations,
the coefficients on Levj (p<0.05, Table 5, Panels
1–4; two-tailed significance) and Agej (p<0.05,
Table 5, Panel 1–3; p<0.10, Panel 4; two-tailed
significance) are positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Coefficient on LnGPj, meanwhile, is negative
and statistically significant implying that IPOs
seeking to raise greater funds were less forthcom-
ing in disclosing information on intellectual capi-
tal at the time of listing than those raising less
funds. Finally, Audj (ExeCPj) coefficients are pos-
itive (negative) but insignificant in all models.
5.5. Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our main findings we
conducted several additional tests. For example,
prior disclosure research frequently cites firm size
and industry as having a significant influence on
disclosure practices. Consequently, we partitioned
the sample into: (a) small and large firm sub-sam-
ples based on proceeds raised; and (b) manufactur-
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 423
18 The highest calculated VIF is 3.81. As VIFs in excess of
10 are deemed to be evidence of serious multicollinearity
(Netter et al., 1989: 40) standard interpretations of the regres-
sion coefficients presented in the tables can be made. Other di-
agnostics (eigenvalues and condition values) further suggest
that multicollinearity is not a significant problem.
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ing and non-manufacturing industry sub-samples.
Regression analysis performed again on the respec-
tive sub-samples did not yield any significantly dif-
ferent results then that reported in Table 5. That is,
results hold for both small and large firms and those
from both manufacturing and non-manufacturing
industries. A review of the various disclosure and
IPO studies indicates a number of factors investi-
gated could have been included as possible control
variables. Whilst we have sought to have been as
comprehensive as possible in our research method
development, it is difficult to ignore the possibility
that omitted variables may influence our reported
results. As a consequence we conducted additional
analysis involving the inclusion of other previously
identified factors as controls for cross-sectional
variations. Factors used in these additional tests in-
cluded operating performance (pre- and post-IPO),
firm’s earnings growth and venture capitalist in-
volvement. Again, additional tests using extra con-
trol variables did not yield different findings
reported in Table 5. Finally, we varied the measure-
ment of some of the independent and control vari-
ables. For instance, in the case of CGScorej, rather
than have a range from zero to three, we used a di-
chotomous scale whereby a firm is scored one if at
least two of the three conditions are met otherwise
zero. All tests using alternative proxy measures for
select independent and control variables do not re-
sult in any significant differences from Table 5 re-
sults.
6. Concluding remarks
Since its initial evolution, scholarly research into
intellectual capital has followed several streams of
enquiry. Aside from considerable attention given
to defining and modelling of intellectual capital, or
the measurement of intellectual capital and its 
respective components, growing attention has 
focused on the reporting of intellectual capital-
related information. Schrand and Verrecchia (2004)
report disclosure research can be categorised into
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 425
Table 5
Multivariate tests
Panel 1: Panel 2: Panel 3: Panel 4:
Variable Base model Test of H1 Test of H2 Test of H3
Intercept 0.061 (0.78) 0.077 (0.83) 0.245 (1.27) 0.231 (1.14)
Control variables
Audj 0.005 (–0.09) –0.017 (–0.17) –0.030 (–0.51) –0.026 (–0.44)
Undj 0.125 (2.97)* 0.122 (2.92)* 0.123 (2.95)* 0.118 (2.82)*
Solj –0.086 (–2.04)** –0.084 (–2.01)** –0.074 (–1.77)‡ –0.071 (–1.67)‡
Levj 0.123 (2.53)** 0.117 (2.39)** 0.122 (2.47)** 0.018 (2.38)**
ExeCPj –0.048 (–0.50) –0.046 (–0.42) –0.079 (–0.74) –0.077 (–0.73)
LnGPj –0.067 (–2.03)** –0.062 (–2.01)** –0.055 (–1.88)‡ –0.040 (–1.79)‡
Agej 0.130 (2.24)** 0.138 (2.32)** 0.124 (2.03)** 0.112 (1.92)‡
Test variables
EDORj 0.106 (2.39)* 0.100 (2.26)** 0.099 (2.24)**
HerfIndConj –0.091 (–1.89)‡ –0.089 (–1.75)‡
EDORj*HerfIndConj –0.123 (–2.23)** –0.116 (–1.99)**
CGScorej 0.120 (1.91)‡
EDORj*CGScorej 0.084 (2.21)**
HerfIndConj*CGScorej 0.029 (0.81)
EDORj*HerfIndConj*CGScorej 0.169 (1.14)
Model summary:
F-Statistic 7.53* 8.50* 8.64* 8.82*
Adjusted R2 0.2390 0.2751 0.2905 0.2914
N 444 444 444 444
Where:
See Table 1 for definitions of variables.
The regression results reported in Panel 1 are based on Equation 1 excluding all test variables whilst results re-
ported in Panel 2 are based on the complete Equation 1. Panel 3 results, meanwhile, are based on Equation 2.
Finally, the regression results reported in Panel 4 are based on Equation 3.
*, ** and ‡ – Significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 or better respectively (two-tailed significance with t-statistic
based on White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix).
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three main streams: (1) nature and type of infor-
mation reported; (2) determinants underlying dis-
closure; and (3) consequences of accounting
information disclosures. At present, studies exam-
ining intellectual capital reporting concentrated on
issues related to Schrand and Verrechia’s (2004)
first stream. Of the few intellectual capital disclo-
sure studies examining the determinants of disclo-
sure, the vast majority rely on traditional factors
(e.g. firm size, economic performance, industry)
whilst examining conventional modes of investor
communication (i.e. the annual report). Our study
differs in two important ways. First, we look to ex-
amine the amount and nature of intellectual capital
disclosure within an IPO setting. Second, we seek
to determine the association between intellectual
capital disclosure and ownership retention at the
time of listing, plus the interaction effects of pro-
prietary costs and corporate governance structure.
Our analysis of 444 IPOs listing on the SGX be-
tween 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2006 in-
dicates the amount of intellectual capital
information disclosed in prospectuses on average
grew annually from 1997 to 2003. This was fol-
lowed by two years of decline before a rebound in
2006. Disclosure associated with human resource
capital, customer capital and process capital
themes followed similar paths to that of the over-
all level of intellectual capital disclosure. In con-
trast, the pattern of average disclosure related to
information technology capital, research and de-
velopment capital and strategic capital themes var-
ied more radically from year-to-year.
Consistent with our predictions, we find a posi-
tive association between the extent of intellectual
capital disclosure and ownership retention.
Specifically, our results imply that when pre-IPO
owners retained a higher level of ownership in the
entity post-IPO there is a greater willingness to
provide investors with greater insights into the
IPO’s intellectual capital resource base and poten-
tial. The positive intellectual capital disclosure –
ownership retention linkage may be indicative of a
broader complementary firm quality – transparen-
cy relationship. Various IPO researchers argue
greater ownership is a reflection of an IPO’s qual-
ity. Conscious of the signalling effect of ownership
retention, pre-IPO owners may wish to supplement
this perception when providing greater transparen-
cy to reinforce confidence amongst investors in the
IPO’s quality. Given the costly nature of signals,
our results suggest that as intellectual capital is
still in its infancy and not fully understood by mar-
ket participants (Johanson, 2003), IPO issuers are
willing to retain a higher level of ownership as a
complementary signal to reinforce the quality and
value relevance of the intellectual capital informa-
tion disclosed.
Additional analysis in consideration of the pos-
sible inhibiting effects of proprietary costs (as pre-
dicted by H2) on the positive intellectual capital
disclosure – ownership retention association indi-
cates a negative significant interaction influence.
This result implies that whilst an IPO with greater
ownership retention post-IPO is likely to have dis-
closed more intellectual capital-related informa-
tion in the prospectus, the extent of disclosure
would have been tempered for those firms entering
a business sector with greater proprietary costs.
That is, due to the threat of competition in highly
concentrated industries an IPO entering these busi-
ness sectors appears reluctant to disclose intellec-
tual capital information in greater quantity for fear
of losing a competitive advantage.
Given the mounting interest related to the impact
of corporate governance on business operations in-
cluding that related to disclosure we extended our
analysis in examining if better corporate gover-
nance structures upon listing influenced the own-
ership retention – proprietary cost interaction on
intellectual capital disclosure levels. Analytical
tests did not support our predictions of a signifi-
cant positive influence on the aforementioned in-
teraction.
Our findings have implications for various par-
ties. For instance, issuers could be at a greater dis-
advantage if intellectual capital disclosures are not
used for any strategic objective. If the disclosure
of more intellectual capital does not assist to re-
duce underpricing or improve long-term post-issue
stock performance but provides key information to
competitors – thereby reducing the IPO’s compet-
itive advantage – then the issuers will be exposed
to additional costs of capital. However, if the dis-
closure of intellectual capital information can be
used strategically to effectively reduce information
asymmetry and improve investor and analyst valu-
ations then the differential between the issue and
first-day offer price can be narrowed. As the
amount of ‘money left on the table’ decreases, the
cost of capital is reduced.19 Our findings may also
have implications for policymakers if greater intel-
lectual capital disclosure is creating a speculative
IPO environment. If investors are bidding up the
price they are willing to pay for an IPO based on
intellectual capital disclosures, without knowing
all the related risks (such as that associated with
the intangible nature of intellectual capital), an un-
healthy speculative environment could evolve.
This is particularly true if issuers are seeking to ex-
ploit this position. Policymakers with the ability to
prescribe reporting standards could introduce a
426 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
19 The phrase ‘money left on the table’ is commonly used 
in IPO literature. This phrase refers to underpricing where
‘money left on the table’ is the capital lost when the company
raises a level of funds at a given issue price when it could have
raised the same amount of capital if stock had been offered at
a higher price.
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basic set of practices to enhance consistency and
comparability in the disclosure of intellectual cap-
ital information.
Whilst our study contributes to an understanding
of the consequences of intellectual capital disclo-
sures, it is not without some caveats. For example,
our analysis only allows us to identify an associa-
tion and not a causal relationship. Future research
may seek to develop a research method to deter-
mine precisely how issuers are using intellectual
capital disclosures in the IPO process. This may
involve a: (i) closer examination of the precise na-
ture of the intellectual capital disclosure (i.e. good
versus bad, qualitative versus quantitative, etc);
(ii) precise placement of the intellectual capital
disclosure in the prospectus; or (iii) intellectual
capital disclosure in the prospectus relative to re-
lated disclosures via other mechanisms (i.e. media
reports, financial analysts reports, etc.). Also, this
study only uses IPO data from a single capital 
market. This may make general extrapolation to
other domestic settings problematic because 
institutional structures in Singapore that are 
contributing to the positive intellectual capital 
disclosure–ownership retention may differ signifi-
cantly in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the in-
teraction influence of proprietary costs could vary
in nations where business sector concentrations
differ. Research using data from other domestic
settings is warranted to determine the precise na-
ture of the intellectual capital disclosures and de-
terminants examined in our study.
Despite some noted caveats, our study is one of
the first to provide valuable insights into the deter-
minants of intellectual capital disclosure beyond
traditional factors and also in an alternative setting
(i.e. IPO). This contribution is important given the
growing significance of intellectual capital to a
firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. Also, it
opens a new avenue for intellectual capital research.
Our findings imply a possible need to rethink the
general reasons and incentives underlying why
IPOs in the ‘new economic’ era may or may not be
disclosing new emerging types of financial and
non-financial information such as that related to
intellectual capital.
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Appendix A
Intellectual Capital Disclosure Index
Item Category and Item Description
Human Resources (28 items)
Employee breakdown by age
Employee breakdown by seniority
Employee breakdown by gender
Employee breakdown by nationality
Employee breakdown by department
Employee breakdown by job function
Employee breakdown by level of education
Rate of employee turnover
Comments on changes in the number of employees 
Comment on employee health and safety
Employee absenteeism rate
Comments on employee absentee rate
Discussion of employee interviews
Statements of policy on competency development
Description of competency development programmes and activities
Education and training expenses
Education and training expenses by number of employees
Employee expenses by number of employees
Recruitment policies of the firm
Separate indication firm has a HRM department, division or function
Job rotation opportunities
Career opportunities
Remuneration and incentive systems
Pensions
Insurance policies 
Statements of dependence on key personnel
Revenues to employee
Value added to employee
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Appendix A
Intellectual Capital Disclosure Index (continued)
Item Category and Item Description
Customers (14 items)
Number of customers
Sales breakdown by customer
Annual sales per segment or product
Average purchase size by customer
Dependence on key customers
Description of customer involvement in firm’s operations
Description of customer relations
Education/training of customers
Ratio of customers to employees
Value added per customer or segment
Absolute market share (%) of the firm within its industry
Relative market share (not expressed as percentage) of the firm
Market share (%) breakdown by country/segment/product
Repurchases by customers
Information Technology (6 items)
Description of investments in information technology
Reason(s) for investments in information technology
Description of existing information technology systems
Software assets held or developed by the firm
Description of intellectual technology facilities (e.g. buildings)
Information technology expenses
Processes (9 items)
Information and communication within the company
Efforts related to the working environment
Working from home
Internal sharing of knowledge and information 
External sharing of knowledge and information
Measure of internal processing failures
Measure of external processing failures
Discussion of fringe benefits and company social programs
Outline of environmental approvals and statements/policies
Research & Development (9 items)
Statements of policy, strategy and/or objectives of R&D activities 
R&D expenses
Ratio of R&D expenses to sales
R&D invested into basic research
R&D invested into product design and development
Details of future prospects regarding R&D
Details of existing company patents
Number of patents and licenses etc.
Information on pending patents
Strategic statements (15 items)
Description of new production technology
Statements of corporate quality performance
Information about strategic alliances of the firm
Objectives and reason for strategic alliances
Comments on the effects of the strategic alliances
Description of the network of suppliers and distributors
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:31
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 429
References
Aboody, D. and Lev, B. (2000). ‘Information asymmetry,
R&D and insider gains’. Journal of Finance, 55(6):
2747–2766.
ACGA 2007, Library-Codes and Rules-Singapore, Asian
Corporate Governance Association. Retrieved 20 July
2007, from http://www.acga-asia.org/content.cfm?
SITE_CONTENT_TYPE_ID=12&COUNTRY ID=276
Allen, F. and Faulhaber, G. (1989). ‘Signalling by under-
pricing in the IPO market’. Journal of Financial
Economics, 23: 303–323.
Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. (1986). ‘Asset pricing and
the bid-ask spread’. Journal of Financial Economics, 17:
223–249.
Battacharya, U. and Daouk, H. (2002), ‘The world price of
insider trading’. Journal of Finance, 57: 75–108.
Beatty, R. (1989). ‘Auditor reputation and the pricing of
initial public offerings’. Accounting Review, 64(4):
693–709.
Beatty, R. and Ritter, J. (1986). ‘Investment banking, repu-
tation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings’.
Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1/2): 213–232.
Beaulieu, P., Williams, S. and Wright, M. (2002).
‘Intellectual capital disclosures in Swedish annual re-
ports’. In N. Bontis (ed.). World Congress on Intellectual
Capital Readings (pp. 135–156). Woburn, MA, USA:
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Berger, P.G. and Hann, R.N. (2007). ‘Segment profitability
and the proprietary and agency costs of disclosure’.
Accounting Review, 82(4): 869–906.
Booth, J. and Smith, R. (1986). ‘Capital raising, underwrit-
ing and the certification hypothesis’. Journal of Financial
Economics, 15(1/2): 261–281.
Botosan, C. (1997). ‘Disclosure level and the cost of equi-
ty capital’. Accounting Review, 72(3): 323–350.
Botosan, C. (2000). ‘Evidence that greater disclosure low-
ers the cost of equity capital’. Bank of America Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 12(4): 60–69.
Botosan, C. (2006). ‘Disclosure and the cost of capital:
what do we know?’ Accounting and Business Research,
36 (Special Issue): 31–40.
Bozzolan, S., Favotto, F. and Ricceri, F. (2003). ‘Italian an-
nual intellectual capital disclosure: an empirical analysis’.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 4(4): 543–558.
Bozzolan, S., O’Regan, P. and Ricceri, F. (2006).
‘Intellectual capital disclosure (ICD): A comparison of
Italy and the UK’. Journal of Human Resource Costing &
Accounting, 10(2): 92–113.
Brennan, N. (2001). ‘Reporting IC in annual reports: evi-
dence from Ireland’. Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability Journal, 14(4): 423–36.
Bukh, P. (2003). ‘The relevance of IC disclosure: A para-
dox?’. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal,
16(1): 49–56.
Bukh, P., Nielsen, C., Gormsen, P. and Mouritsen, J.
(2005a). ‘Disclosure of information on intellectual capital
in Danish IPO prospectuses’. Accounting, Auditing and
Accountability Journal, 18(6): 713–732.
Bukh, P., Rimmel, G., Koga, C., Nielsen, C., Tadanori, Y.
and Sakakibara, S. (2005b). ‘Intellectual capital in
Japanese and Danish IPO prospectuses: A comparative
analysis’. European Accounting Association Congress,
Dublin, Ireland.
Certo, S., Daily, C. and Dalton, D. (2001). ‘Signalling firm
value through board structure: an investigation of initial
public offerings’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
(Winter): 33–50.
Chan, L., Lakonishok, J. and Sougiannis, T. (2001). ‘The
stock market valuation of research and development ex-
penditures’. Journal of Finance, 56(6): 2431–2456.
Chen, C. and Jaggi, B. (2000). ‘Association between inde-
pendent non-executive directors, family control and fi-
nancial disclosures in Hong Kong’. Journal of Accounting
and Public Policy, 19: 285–310.
Chen, C. and Mohan, N. (2002). ‘Underwriter spread, un-
derwriter reputation, and IPO underpricing: A simultane-
ous equation analysis’. Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, 29(3/4): 521–540.
Clarkson, P. (1994). ‘The underpricing of initial public of-
ferings, ex ante uncertainty, and proxy selection’.
Accounting and Finance, 34(2): 67–78.
Clarkson, P., Dontoh, A., Richardson, G. and Sefcik, S.
(1992). ‘The voluntary inclusion of earnings forecasts in
IPO prospectuses’. Contemporary Accounting Research,
8(2): 601–626.
Clarkson, P. and Merkley, J. (1994). ‘Ex ante uncertainty
and the underpricing of initial public offerings: Further
Canadian evidence’. Revue Canadienne des Sciences de
Appendix A
Intellectual Capital Disclosure Index (continued)
Item Category and Item Description
Strategic statements (15 items) (continued)
Statements of image and brand 
Corporate culture statements
Statements about best practices
Organisational structure of the firm
Utilisation of energy, raw materials and other input goods
Investment in the environment
Description of community involvement
Information on corporate social responsibility and objective
Description of employee contracts/contractual issues
Disclosure index adapted from Beaulieu et al. (2002), Bukh et al. (2005a) and Williams (2001)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:31
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
l’Administration, 11(1): 54–67.
Coles, J., Loewenstein, U. and Suay, J. (1995). ‘On equi-
librium pricing under parameter uncertainty’. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30(3): 347–364.
Cooke, T. (1989). ‘Voluntary disclosure by Swedish com-
panies’. Journal of International Financial Management
and Accounting, 1: 171–195.
Darrough, M. and Stoughton, N. (1990). ‘Financial disclo-
sure policy in an entry game’. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 12: 219–244.
Diamond, D. and Verrecchia, R. (1991). ‘Disclosure, liq-
uidity and the cost of capital’. Journal of Finance, 46(4):
1325–1359.
Downes, D. and Heinkel, R. (1982). ‘Signalling and the
valuation of unseasoned new issues’. Journal of Finance,
37(1): 1–10.
Dye, R. (1986). ‘Proprietary and non-proprietary disclo-
sures’. Journal of Business, 59(2): 331–366.
Elliott, R. and Jacobson, P. (1994). ‘Commentary: Costs
and benefits of business information disclosure’.
Accounting Horizons, 8(4): 80–96.
Eng, L. and Mak, Y. (2003). ‘Corporate governance and
voluntary disclosure’. Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, 22(4): 325–345.
Eustace, C. (2000). ‘The intangible economy – impact and
policy issues’. European Commission.
Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983). ‘Separation of ownership
and control’. Journal of Law and Economics, 25:
301–325.
Firth, M. and Liau-Tan, C. (1998). ‘Auditor quality, sig-
nalling, and the valuation of initial public offerings’.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25 (1 and
2): 145–165.
Garcia-Meca, E., Parra, I., Larran, M. and Martinez, I.
(2005). ‘The explanatory factors of intellectual capital
disclosure to financial analysts’. European Accounting
Review, 14(1): 63–104.
Gompers, P. (1995). ‘Optimal investment, monitoring, and
the staging of venture capital’. Journal of Finance, 50:
1461–1489.
Gonedes, N. (1978). ‘Corporate signalling with dividends,
stock repurchases and accounting disclosures: An empiri-
cal study’. Journal of Accounting Research, 16 (Spring):
26–79.
Greene, W. (1999). Econometric Analysis. 4th edn. New
York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
Gröjer, J. (2001). ‘Intangibles and accounting classifica-
tions: in search of a classification strategy’. Accounting
Organizations and Society, 26(7/8): 695–713.
Gul, F. and Leung, S. (2004). ‘Board leadership, outside di-
rectors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosures’.
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(5): 351–379.
Guo, R., Lev, B. and Zhou, N. (2004). ‘Competitive costs
of disclosure by biotech IPOs’. Journal of Accounting
Research, 42(2): 319–355.
Guthrie, J. and Petty, R. (2000). ‘IC: Australian annual re-
porting practices’. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 1(3):
241–250.
Hair, J., Anderson, R., Tatham, R. and Black, W. (1995).
Multivariate Data Analysis. 4th edn. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Healy, P. and Palepu, K. (1993). ‘The effect of firms’ fi-
nancial disclosure strategies on stock prices’. Accounting
Horizons, 7(1): 1–11.
Ho, C. and Williams, S. (2003). ‘International comparative
analysis of the association between board structure and
the efficiency of value added by a firm from its physical
capital and intellectual capital resources’. International
Journal of Accounting, 38(4): 465–491.
Hughes, P. (1986). ‘Signalling by direct disclosure under
asymmetric information’. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 8: 119–142.
Hughes, P. and Thakor, A. (1992). ‘Litigation risk, inter-
mediation and the underpricing of initial public offer-
ings’. Review of Financial Studies, 5(4): 709–742.
Jog, V. and McConomy, B. (2003). ‘Voluntary disclosure 
of management earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses’.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30(1 and 2):
125–167.
Johanson, U. (2003). ‘Why are capital market actors am-
bivalent to information about certain indicators on intel-
lectual capital?’. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal, 16(1): 31–38.
Johnson, J.M. and Miller, R.E. (1988). ‘Investment banker
prestige and underpricing of initial public offerings’.
Financial Management, 17(2): 19–29.
Keloharju, M. (1993). ‘The winner’s curse, legal liability,
and the long-run price performance of initial public offer-
ings in Finland’. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(2):
251–277.
Kim, M. and Ritter, J. (1999). ‘Valuing IPOs’. Journal of
Financial Economics, 53: 409–437.
Koh, F., and Walter, T. (1989). ‘A direct test of Rock’s
model and the pricing of unseasoned issue’. Journal of
Financial Economics, 23: 251–272.
La Porta, R. Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny,
R. (1997). ‘Legal determinants of external finance’.
Journal of Finance, 52(3): 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny,
R. (1998). ‘Law and finance’. Journal of Political
Economy, 106(6): 1113–1155.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. (1993). ‘Cross-sectional deter-
minants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures’.
Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2): 246–271.
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. (1997). ‘The relation between
security returns, firm earnings and industry earnings’.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(2): 607–629.
Leland, H. and Pyle, D. (1977). ‘Informational asymme-
tries, financial structure and financial intermediation’.
Journal of Finance, 32(2): 371–387.
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. (2000). ‘The economic conse-
quences of increased disclosure’. Journal of Accounting
Research, 38 (Supplement): 91–124.
Lev, B. (1992). ‘Information disclosure strategy’.
California Management Review, 34 (4):9–32.
Lev, B. (2001). Intangibles: Management, measurement
and reporting. Washington, D.C., WA: Brookings
Institution Press.
Lev, B. and Zarowin, P. (1999). ‘The boundaries of finan-
cial reporting and how to extend them’. Journal of
Accounting Research, 37(2): 353–383.
Levis, M. (1990). ‘The winner’s curse problem, interest
costs and the underpricing of initial public offerings’.
Economic Journal, 100(399): 76–89.
Li, J., Pike, R. and Haniffa, R. (2008). ‘Intellectual capital
disclosure and corporate governance structure in UK
firms’. Accounting and Business Research, 38(2):
137–159.
Ljungqvist, A. and Wilhelm, W. (2002). ‘IPO allocations:
discriminatory or discretionary’. Journal of Financial
Economics, 65(2): 167–201.
Lombardo, D. and Pagano, M. (2002). ‘Law and equity
markets: a simple model’. Stanford Law School and
University of Salerno: Working paper.
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J. (2002). ‘Why don’t issuers get
upset about leaving money on the table in IPOs?’ Review
of Financial Studies, 15(2): 413–443.
Mak, Y. and Chng, C. (2000). ‘Corporate governance 
430 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:31
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
Vol. 38 No. 5. 2008 431
practices and disclosures in Singapore: An Update’.
OCED/World Bank 2nd Asian Roundtable on Corporate
Governance.
Marston, C. and Shrives, P. (1991). ‘The use of disclosure
indices in accounting research: a review article’. British
Accounting Review, 23: 195–210.
Megginson, W.L. and Weiss, K.A. (1991). ‘Venture capi-
talist certification in initial public offerings’. Journal of
Finance, 46(3): 879–903.
Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984). ‘Corporate financing and
investment decisions when firms have information that
investors do not have’. Journal of Financial Economics,
13(2): 187–221.
Netter, J., Wasserman, W., and Kutner, M. (1989). Applied
Regression Models. Homewood, Illinois, IL: Richard D.
Irwin.
Ofek, E. and Richardson, M. (2003). ‘DotCom mania:
The rise and fall of internet stock prices’. Journal of
Finance, 58(3): 1113–1137.
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (2006). Political
and Economic Risk Consultancy Report: Perceptions of
Corporate Governance Standards Singapore: PERC.
Rusmin., Van der Zahn, J-L.W.M., Tower, G. and 
Brown, A. (2006). ‘Auditor independence, auditor spe-
cialisation and earnings management: further evidence
from Singapore’. International Journal of Accounting,
Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 3(2): 166–93.
Schrand, C. and Verrecchia, R. (2004). ‘Disclosure choice
and cost of capital: evidence from underpricing in initial
public offerings’. Unpublished working paper: University
of Pennsylvania.
Scott, T. (1994). ‘Incentives and disincentives for financial
disclosure: voluntary disclosure of defined benefit pen-
sion plan information by Canadian firms’. Accounting
Review, 69(1): 26–43.
Sengupta, P. (1998). ‘Corporate disclosure quality and the
cost of debt’. Accounting Review, 73(4): 459–474.
Singapore Stock Exchange (2006). SGX Factbook.
Singapore: Singapore Stock Exchange.
Strom, N. (2005). ‘Initial public offerings disclosure strat-
egy’. Uppsala University, Sweden: Working paper.
Su, D. and Fleisher, B. (1998). ‘Risk, return and regulation
in Chinese stock markets’. Journal of Economics and
Business, 50(3): 239–257.
The Fraster Institute 2007, 2007 World Freedom 
Economy Report. Retrieved 30 November 2007, from
http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html.
Titman, S. and Trueman, B. (1986). ‘Information quality
and the valuation of new issues’. Journal of Accounting
and Economics. 8(2): 159–173.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J. and Zijlstra, S. (2001).
‘Reporting on intellectual capital’. Accounting, Auditing
and Accountability Journal, 14(4): 456–476.
Vergauwen, P. and van Alem, F. (2005). ‘Annual report IC
disclosures in the Netherlands, France and Germany’.
Journal of Intellectual Capital, 6(1): 89–104.
Verrecchia, R. (1983). ‘Discretionary disclosure’. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 5(3): 179–194.
Walker, M. (2006). ‘How can business reporting be im-
proved? A research perspective’. Accounting and
Business Research, 36 (Special Issue): 95–105.
Williams, S. (2001). ‘Are IC performance and disclosure
practice related?’. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 2(3):
192–203.
World Bank (2007). Doing Business 2007: How to Reform
Washington, D.C., WA: World Bank.
Zhang, G. (2001). ‘Private information production, public
disclosure, and the cost of capital: theory and implica-
tions’. Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(2):
363–384.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:31
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:31
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
